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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 

















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 =
=
===================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=íÜÉ=ÑçìåÇ~íáçå=Ñçê=áååçî~íáçå======== - 315 - 
=
=
Best Practice in Technology Acquisition: Early Licensing of 
Technology before or during Prove-out Phase 
Presenter:  Kenyon David Potter, is a professional engineer and educator.  Mr. Potter 
received a Bachelor of Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; a Master of 
Science from the University of California, Berkeley; and a law degree from the University of 
California, Hastings College of the Law.   Mr. Potter has written articles and made presentations 
on behavior of physical systems, as well as contract management and administration.   He is 
currently the Manager of Design & Construction Policy for the University of California and is also 
appointed as an Instructor at the UC Berkeley Extension. 
University of California 
Office of the President 
1111 Franklin St., 6th Floor 








Best Practices in procurement within the defense industry include various strategic 
practices to assure that supplies are adequate to meet demand and support military readiness.   
Existing practices in procurement may often be sufficient to assure an adequate supply, but they 
are not sufficient to assure an adequate supply of technology-based, mass-produced goods.  An 
example of such a technology-based, mass-produced good is body armor.  A proposed best 
practice in technology acquisition is early licensing of technologies underlying such goods.  This 
paper explores the advantages of using early licensing to assure that supplies of technology-
based goods are adequate to meet demand.    
Introduction 
Best Practices in procurement within the Defense industry include various strategic 
procedures to ensure supplies are adequate to meet demand.  For example, in the context of 
commodities, such strategies historically included bulk purchasing and warehousing of supplies.  
In contrast, an example of a more recent strategic practice is supply-chain management; this 
method includes just-in-time production, which is often appropriate for procurement of complex 
systems such as aircraft and other vehicles. Yet, neither of these strategies is necessarily 
appropriate for new technologies that must be mass-produced.  First, successful implementation 
of bulk purchasing and warehousing requires goods which have a long design-life and results in 
increased warehousing costs and the potential stockpiling of out-dated commodities. Second, 
just-in-time production depends on stable demand and does not address large fluctuation in 
demand—e.g., a steep ramp-up.  Therefore, another strategy is necessary in order to deliver 
supplies of such goods adequate to meet demand with neither incurring excessive costs in 
warehousing nor excessive delays in delivery.  
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To facilitate such technology acquisition, the author proposes that the prove-out phase 
should be conducted under a licensing agreement that requires the supplier to license to the 
Department of Defense [DoD], or its suppliers, the right to manufacturer the technology at a 
predetermined royalty rate on sales—from 3% to 10%—depending on the particular technology.  
This paper explores the advantages of using early licensing.  By using this approach, the DoD 
can shorten the technology acquisition process and can utilize multiple suppliers of a technology 
to ensure continuity in its supply chains in the event that one vendor cannot meet DoD 
requirements.  A similar approach could be used for acquisitions of proven technologies as well.   
BACKGROUND 
In conjunction with the Department of Defense’s strategic realignment of military forces, 
Rumsfeld (2004) is seeking to make combat troops “lighter, more readily deployable, and more 
self sufficient” (para. 4).  To meet these strategic objectives, the DoD has realigned military 
acquisitions toward various communications technologies, including networking technologies.  
Yet, a recent report demonstrated that military planners relied extensively on networking 
technologies that were not sufficiently robust for reliable use by soldiers on the battlefield 
(Talbot, 2004).  The technology did not meet the specific communication requirements of the 
field combat soldier; thus, prove-out of the technology failed.   This paper will examine the effect 
of operational objectives on the field combat soldier whose vital importance is recognized in 
urban settings, especially in view of recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.  The field combat 
soldier is expected to function as a “land warrior” and, at times, is also expected to be a 
“peacekeeper.”  The role of the field combat soldier is often a subject of debate in the defense 
community.  Notwithstanding the debate, the field soldier must be equipped to meet operational 
objectives.  First, the field soldier is expected to be lighter—which implies less-heavy 
equipment, but not necessarily less-protective gear—to increase mobility.  Second, the field 
soldier is expected to be more readily deployable; this requirement also implies less-heavy 
equipment to reduce logistical and transportation effort.  Third, the field soldier is expected to be 
more self-sufficient to decrease required support.    
The role of acquisition should be proactive with respect to these strategic objectives in 
order to insure the field combat soldier is prepared to meet operational mission objectives.  To 
meet such objectives, a field combat soldier requires certain equipment and training to increase 
survivability and operational effectiveness. A discussion of training is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  Yet, in regard to equipment, a field combat soldier should have appropriate weapons, 
protective gear, and tools.  The appropriateness of specific weapons, protective gear, and tools 
is often a subject of debate by members of the defense community.  The appropriateness of a 
particular weapon, protective gear, or tool would ideally be determined by operational objectives 
rather than economics.  However, assuming the appropriateness of a particular weapon, 
protective gear, or tool were determined by operational objectives, the availability of such 
weapons, protective gear, or tools is controlled by the economics of supply and demand. For 
example, the availability of one such protective gear (e.g., body armor) was limited by supply 
despite its appropriateness to operational objectives. In another example, availability of 
adequate supply of RF receivers used for battlefield communications was limited by the failure 
of networking technologies. This failure was due in part to placing undue reliance on networking 
technologies not yet proven effective in the battlefield conditions (Talbot, 2004).  Yet, miniature 
RF receivers could be integrated into helmets—similar to pilots’—to reduce the reliance on 
networking technologies.  In a further example, lightweight portable gates are commercially 
available that could be configured to make suitable roadway check points.  However, availability 
of portable gates to establish conspicuous roadway check points was limited by operational 
objectives.   
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Prove-out of such technologies requires testing in the laboratory setting and in the field 
environment, e.g., actual combat.  Since the field testing is generally superior to laboratory 
testing to prove-out a particular technology, acquisition and procurement officers typically order 
a small quantity of product based on a technology in order to perform field tests to demonstrate 
its effectiveness on the battlefield.  The DoD would place a larger order of the technology only 
after proof of a technology’s robustness.  This incremental approach to procurement is a 
practice called pilot testing.  Such a practice may be successful in avoiding the risk of procuring 
a large quantity of goods that fail to meet requirements.  However, after such testing, there 
remain other risks that are not addressed—including the lack of adequate supplies to meet 
demand (as demonstrated by the inadequate supply of body armor in Iraq) (Moss, 2005). 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research project examined procurement of technology-based, mass-produced 
goods rather than complex systems.  The research first examined the two traditional 
approaches to procurement of such goods: “make” vs. “buy” (PMI, 2004).  Assuming that the 
defense sector would normally “buy” such goods from commercial sources rather than “make” 
such goods, the research examines the traditional approaches to acquisition of goods: 
“purchase” vs. “lease” (Ammons, 2002). Given the nature of such goods (i.e., consumable), this 
research project eliminated the alternative of acquisition through a leasing arrangements and 
focused on the alternative acquisition through purchasing.  Yet, acquisition through purchasing 
does not acquire the rights to underlying technology.  Hence, in the context of technology, 
another approach deserved examination—namely the acquisition of the underlying technology.  
However, given that many technologies have both military and commercial applications, outright 
purchase of the rights to the underlying technology is not feasible.   Nevertheless, a partial 
purchase of rights (a.k.a. a “non-exclusive license”) is feasible; this research explored the 
conditions under which such a license would be exercised.  Finally, this research conducted a 
case study of the body armor.  
DISCUSSION 
Ertex and Griffin (2002) explain that a supply chain can be dominated by either supplier 
or buyer; they assert that in recent years certain large buyers have increased dominance over 
their suppliers.  Yet, the DoD has not exerted such dominance over its suppliers.  Currently, 
federal agencies such as NASA and the DoD often demand only a royalty in return for providing 
research funding.  Yet, the Federal Acquisition Regulations [FAR] (Part 27, Subpart 27.3) grant 
a compulsory, non-exclusive license to the government for technologies invented under 
government-funded contracts (FAR, 2004).  For example, since the DoD controls the funding, 
the DoD has the leverage to demand superior contract terms from the researchers inventing the 
technology. A superior contract term would be to obtain a non-exclusive license from the 
researchers to manufacture goods based on the technology in the event that inventors fail to 
bring the technology to market within a reasonable time.  Similarly, the DoD does not demand 
the right to assure adequate supply of a particular good in return for placing a large order with a 
single manufacturer.  Even though the compulsory license under the FAR may not apply, the 
DoD could make such a license an express term or condition of the contract.  A superior 
contract term or condition would be to obtain a license to carry out the manufacture of the good 
upon either of the following terms: 
• With respect to labor-intensive goods, failure of supplier to increase production 
by 100% upon 30-days notice and by 200% upon 60-days notice (by adding a 
shift or shifts). 
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• With respect to capital-intensive goods, failure to expand production capacity by 
100% upon 60-days notice and by 200% upon 120-days notice (by adding a 
production line or lines). 
The license would enable the DoD to obtain adequate supplies by ordering from 
additional suppliers. By exercise of the license, the DoD would pay a royalty at a rate of from 
3% to 10% to the supplier if (and only if) the technology the DoD used had been patented or 
made proprietary by the supplier.  The royalty rate would be determined to approximate the 
typical royalty rate in the industry and not to exceed the audited net profit of the supplier.  In this 
way, the supplier could not use patented or proprietary technology to prevent the mass 
production of goods at the order of the DoD. 
CASE STUDY 
In summary, body armor is a consumable good based on the underlying technology of 
ballistic-resistant panels.  The best available commercial technology comprises plates of boron 
carbide (Bernstein, 2002).  To meet demand, body armor must be mass produced.  The DoD 
had a contract with a single manufacturer to deliver body armor containing the boron carbide 
plates.  In response to increased orders from the DoD, the manufacturers increased production 
to maximum capacity at 25,000 jackets per month (Loeb & Labbé, 2003). Yet, months are still 
required to produce a supply adequate to meet the demand of more than 80,000 jackets.   
Although the manufacturers marginally increased production, the DoD lacked sufficient leverage 
to force manufacturer(s) to dramatically increase production by opening a new production line, 
let alone building a new production facility.  It is noteworthy that demand will continue to outpace 
supply if all armed military personnel, including reserves and the national guard, are to be 
issued such body armor.  Thus, in this case, early licensing of underlying technology would 
have been appropriate; it would have enabled the DoD to place orders with other manufacturers 
if the existing manufacturers could not deliver sufficient supplies to meet the demand.   
FUTURE WORK 
Many research laboratories in the United States are busy developing technologies with 
military applications.  An example is the human exoskeleton which is currently in laboratory 
testing and will soon undergo prove-out in the field (Berkeley, 2004).  Undoubtedly, a successful 
prototype of the exoskeleton will involve inventions for which inventors will seek patents.   If the 
DoD pursued enforcement of the compulsory government license pursuant to FAR 27.302(c) for 
the exoskeleton, the Department could increase production of exoskeletons without the 
inventors’ refusal.  Even if a commercial entity further develops the exoskeleton without 
government funding, and the compulsory license did not apply, the DoD could pursue an early-
licensing approach under a contract with that commercial entity when ordering a small quantity 
of exoskeletons prior to the prove-out phase.  
CONCLUSION 
Early licensing of technology—prior to the prove-out phase—is a best practice to acquire 
rights in underlying technology.  Such early licensing will be useful when the DoD seeks to 
rapidly increase supplies of technology-based goods.  Simply increasing orders may 
insufficiently increase supply if a supplier has little incentive to increase production.  Moreover, if 
the goods ordered by the DoD are based on patented or proprietary technology, the DoD may 
be unable to seek out other suppliers.  Thus, use of early licensing of underlying technology 
would provide the DoD the leverage to force a supplier to increase production or to split orders 
among other suppliers.  
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